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I. INTRODUCTION
WATCH LISTS HAVE BECOME the sustenance of nationalsecurity. Although the U.S. government has employed
watch lists in many contexts in our history, from the Attorney
General's List of Subversive Organizations to the terrorist watch
lists of today, there has been a significant expansion in recent
years.' Watch lists can be a useful means of monitoring or re-
stricting potentially dangerous individuals.2 However, they can
also significantly impede lawful activity.3 The story of Rahinah
Ibrahim is a quintessential example of such an impediment.
Rahinah Ibrahim is a Malaysian citizen who was in the United
States from 2001 to 2005 on a valid student visa studying to ob-
tain her doctoral degree at Stanford University.' On January 2,
2005, Ibrahim was to travel to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to pre-
sent her doctoral research, but when she arrived at the airport,
officials informed her that she could not board because her
name was on the No Fly List.' Local police, at the behest of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), then handcuffed
and detained her.' After approximately two hours, the FBI re-
quested her release, and she was told that her name would no
longer be on the No Fly List.' The next day Ibrahim again at-
tempted to board a flight for Malaysia but was again told her
I See Robert Justin Goldstein, The Attorney General's List of Subversive Organiza-
tions: A Sad Lesson from American History, HIsT. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 30, 2014,
10:03 PM), http://hnn.us/article/59446; Jason Ryan, No-Fly List Has Doubled in
Size and Will Get Bigger, Say Gov't Officials, ABC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2010), http://abc
news.go.com/Blotter/fly-list-doubled-size-bigger-govt-officials/story?id=10065231
&singlePage=true.
2 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-476, TERRORIST WATCHLIST:
ROUTINELY ASSESSING IMPACTS OF AGENCY ACTIONS SINCE THE DECEMBER 25, 2009
ATrEMPTED ATTACH COULD HELP INFORM FUTURE EFFORTS 27-28 (2012).
3 See Lizette Alvarez, Meet Mikey, 8: U.S. Has Him on Watch List, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
3, 2010, at Al; Rachel L. Swarns, Senator? Terrorist? A Watch List Stops Kennedy at
Airport, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2004), www.nytimes.com/2004/08/20/national/
20flight.html.
4 Second Amended Complaint at 9, Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No.
C06-0545 WIHA (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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name was on the No Fly List; however, she was eventually able to
board the plane and travel to Malaysia, albeit with enhanced se-
curity screenings along the way.'
On March 10, 2005, Ibrahim attempted to return to the
United States from Malaysia to finish her doctoral degree at
Stanford University.' At the airport, the ticketing agent refused
to allow her to board a plane to the United States until she ob-
tained clearance from the U.S. embassy.10 She subsequently at-
tempted to clear her name by submitting a request to the TSA's
"Passenger Identity Verification Program."" But the TSA only
responded after she filed a lawsuit against the United States, and
in its response, the TSA only stated that "[if] it has been deter-
mined that a correction to the records is warranted, these
records have been modified."12 Ibrahim has never been allowed
back into the United States.1 3 She is still fighting for that
opportunity."
The immediate concern for Ibrahim is how to get off the No
Fly List. The larger question that we, as Americans, should be
asking ourselves is what should nonresident aliens like Ibrahim
be able to do to challenge their name being on such a list. The
latter question is the focus of this article. The courts and com-
mentators have approached the problem of watch lists generally
from a variety of angles, such as increasing the level of bureau-
cratic efficacy, providing due process rights and potentially
other constitutional rights to individuals on the lists, or ex-




11 Id. at 987-88 (The Passenger Identity Verification Program was a predeces-
sor program to the Department of Homeland Security's Traveler Redress Inquiry
Program).
12 Id. at 988 (quotation marks omitted) (The holding of the court will be dis-
cussed in Part IV).
13 Id. at 987.
14 The Associated Press, Trial Begins in Legal Challenge to No-Fly List, USA TODAY
(Dec. 2, 2013, 8:51 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/
12/02/professor-no-fly-trial/3822151/.
15 See, e.g., Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 983 (finding that aliens who establish a "signifi-
cant voluntary connection" with the United States may assert constitutional
claims under at least the First and Fifth Amendments); Maxim Brumbach, Are
You on the List? Dispelling the Myth of a Total Exemption From the Privacy Act's Civil
Remedies in Shearson v. DHS, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1027 (2013) (advocating either
expanding the Privacy Act of 1974 by limiting exempted agency activities or en-
acting other privacy-centric legislation); Peter M. Shane, The Bureaucratic Due Pro-
cess of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 804 (2007) (proposing a
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the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has instituted its
own redress procedure called the Traveler Redress Inquiry Pro-
gram (TRIP).' 6 But in many cases, the TRIP procedures are woe-
fully inadequate.1 7
This article attempts to propose a framework that lies some-
where between the limited review provided under the DHS's re-
dress procedures and the expansive protections of the
Constitution's Due Process Clause. This article frames the sug-
gested model on the process the State Department currently
uses to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion."' While this model has some drawbacks and deficiencies, it
is virtuous in that it offers greater transparency and provides for
both redress within the agency and the ability for judicial re-
view.19 Striking the right balance between watch-listing proce-
dures and national security is key; it will increase not only the
fairness and legitimacy but also the efficacy of the lists. 2 0 The
current system lacks these fundamental aspects.2 1
In Part II, this article will discuss the historical develop of the
watch lists, the current legal structure, the process for adding
individuals to the TSA Selectee and No Fly Lists, and the current
method for challenging one's inclusion on these lists. Part III
will discuss the need for a change, and Part IV will discuss op-
tions suggested by commentators and the method used by the
Ninth Circuit. Lastly, Part V will discuss the alternative frame-
work this article proposes.
fundamental fairness approach to the front-end watch-list procedures and a va-
ried approach to challenging inclusion to a watch list based on the reasons for
being on the watch list and the implementation of the suggested front-end
procedures).
16 DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), DEPARTMENT HOMELAND SE-
CURITY, www.dhs.gov/dhs-trip (last visited Nov. 4, 2013 at 10:01 PM).
17 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PUB. No. OIG-
09-103, EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY TRAVELER RE-
DRESS INQUIRY PROGRAM 33-52 (2009) [herienafter OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP].
18 See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012).
19 See id.
20 See Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 BuF. L. REv.
461, 461-65 (2013).
21 See OIG, EFFECTVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 79-90.
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II. STAGE SETTING
A. HISTORiCAL BACKDROP
Before 9/11, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was
responsible for aviation security.22 Congress had tasked the FAA
with the conflicting mission of "regulating the safety and secur-
ity of U.S. civil aviation while also promoting the civil aviation
industry."2 The FAA promulgated rules and regulations that it
required the aviation industry to implement.24 Its scheme aimed
to create multiple layers of prevention, including passenger
prescreening and checking passenger names against the FAA's
No Fly List.2 5 However, despite calls for increased sharing of
watch lists among government agencies, the FAA's No Fly List
generally did not contain information from the Federal Bureau
of Investigation's (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency's, or State
Department's watch lists.26 In fact, the FAA's No Fly List con-
tained only twelve names as of 9/11 while other government
watch lists contained thousands of names.
The situation began to change after 9/11, albeit in fits and
starts. The newly formed TSA28 took over responsibility for the
aviation security,29 and interagency sharing of watch list infor-
mation became a larger focus.3 o The Aviation and Transporta-
tion Security Act provided the TSA with broad powers to identify
and counteract potential threats of terrorism and risks to airline
safety." Under this authority, the TSA issued Security Directives
22 NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMIS-






28 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). This Act
created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under the Depart-
ment of Transportation and tasked it with, among other things, aviation security.
Id. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 moved the TSA under the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 203, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002)
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 203 (2012)).
29 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-322, INFORMATION TECHNOL-
OGY: TERRORIST WATCH LISTS SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED TO PROMOTE BETTER IN-
TEGRATION AND SHARING 12-13 (2003) (explaining which agencies are
responsible for each government watch list).
30 Id. at 4.
31 Aviation and Transportation Security Act § 101.
6012014]
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that created two lists: the No Fly and Selectee Lists.12 The TSA
independently operated these lists until 2003.13 In 2003, Presi-
dent Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6,
which, among other things required the Attorney General to
"establish an organization to consolidate the Government's ap-
proach to terrorism screening . . .. Pursuant to this directive,
the Attorney General established the Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC), which created, and maintains, the consolidated terrorist
watch list called the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) .
B. THE CURRENT LEGAL STRUCTURE, THE NOMINATION
PROCESS, AND WHAT HAPPENS TO THOSE
ON WATCH LiSTS
The TSC maintains the TSDB by evaluating nominations from
the FBI and National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC).36
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 in conjunction with
Homeland Security Presidential Directives 11 and 24 permit the
TSDB to "contain information about individuals known or sus-
pected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in
preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism and terrorists
activities."3 7 The FBI and NCTC are to apply a "reasonable-suspi-
cion standard to determine which individuals are appropriate
for inclusion in the TSDB." 8 Once the FBI or NCTC makes this
32 TRANsP. SEC. ADMIN., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE TSA TRAVELER
IDENTITY VERIFICATION PROGRAM 2 (2006) [hereinafter TSA, PRIVACY IMPACT As-
SESSMENT FOR TIVP]; Declaration of Lee S. Longmire 11 6-8, Green v. Transp.
Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (No. CV 04-0763Z), availa-
ble at http://hasbrouck.org/documents/nofly/exhibitA-Longmire.pdf. The no-
fly list existed prior to the creation of the TSA; the FAA maintained a no-fly list
but used it sparingly. See 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 22, at 82 (2004).
3 TSA, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR TIVP, supra note 32, at 2.
34 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6-Integration and Use of
Screening Information To Protect Against Terrorism, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1174-75
(Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/
pdf/PPP-2003-book2-doc-pgl 174.pdf.
3 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-476, supra note 2, at 6, 36.
36 Id. The NCTC receives nominations from the Central Intelligence Agency,
Department of State, FBI, and other executive branch agencies. Id. The FBI
nominates domestic terrorists directly to the TSC, but the FBI refers its nomina-
tions of international terrorists to the NCTC. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. 09-25, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S TER-
RORIST WATCHLIST NOMINATION PRACTICES 4-5 (2009) [hereinafter OIG, FBI
WATCHLIST PRACTICES].
37 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12476, supra note 2, at 7.
38 Id. "[T]o meet the reasonable-suspicion standard, the nominator shall con-
sider the totality of information available that, taken together with rational infer-
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determination, they send the appropriate information to the
TSC, which then evaluates the nominations for completeness
and accuracy, and, if appropriate, places the individual on the
TSDB.
Numerous federal agencies utilize the TSDB.4 0 However,
agencies generally do not use the entire list, but rather a subset
of the list applicable to their particular mission."1 The TSA's No
Fly and Selectee Lists are an example of such subsets. 2 These
lists "are intended to prevent specific categories of terrorists
from boarding commercial aircraft or subject these terrorist to
secondary screening prior to boarding, and are not for use as
law enforcement or intelligence-gathering tools."4 3 The No Fly
List prohibits listed individuals from boarding an aircraft that
will fly within the United States or to the United States," while
the Selectee List subjects the listed travelers to enhanced screen-
ing before boarding a flight.4 5 Travelers on the Selectee List will
not be able to print boarding passes online or at kiosks and will
have to show identification to a ticketing agent to get a boarding
pass. 6 It is important to note that "the Selectee List is not a
default for those who do not qualify for inclusion on the No Fly
List . . ."-that is, the TSA employs different criteria for each
list.47
The TSA promulgates rules and regulations for utilizing the
lists under the authority granted in the Aviation and Transporta-
tion Security Act and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Pre-
ences from that information, reasonably warrants a determination that an
individual is known or suspected to be or have been knowingly engaged in con-
duct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism or ter-
rorists activities." Id. n.18.
39 Id. at 7.
40 OIG, FBI WATCHLIST PRACTICES, supra note 36, at vi-ix.
41 See Letter from Arthur M. Cummins, II, Exec. Assistant Dir., Nat'1 Sec.
Branch, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to Carlton I. Mann, Assistant Inspector
Gen. for Inspections, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 17, 2009), in OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PUB. No. OIG-09-103, EFFECTIVE-
NESS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY TRAVELER REDRESS INQUIRY PRO-
GRAM 126 (2009).
42 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-476, supra note 2, at 41 n.1.
43 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PUB. No. OIG-09-
64, ROLE OF THE No FLY AND SELECTEE LISTS IN SECURING COMMERCIAL AVIATION
11 (2009) [hereinafter OIG, ROLE OF WATCH LISTS].
44 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 91.
45 Id. at 91-92.
46 Id.
47 OIG, RoLE OF WATCH LISTS, supra note 43, at 11.
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vention Act of 2004.4 In 2009, the TSA began to implement the
latest iteration of these rules under a program called Secure
Flight, which provides a multi-step process for screening passen-
gers.4 9 Secure Flight first requires airlines to submit passenger
information to an automated matching tool.5 0 The matching
tool compares passenger information against the No Fly and Se-
lectee Lists, and potentially other watch lists if circumstances
dictate added screening for a particular flight or airport.5 ' TSA
staff manually reviews potential matches generated by the auto-
mated system for accuracy. Depending on the results, the TSA
will then instruct the airline to either issue the boarding pass in
the usual manner, identify the individual for enhanced screen-
ing, or deny the individual service.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 and Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Com-
mission Act of 2007 also require the DHS and the TSA to pro-
vide a means of redress for impacted passengers.5 ' To this end,
the DHS currently operates the TRIP system. 55
C. DHS's REDRESS APPROACH: FIGHTING BLIND
The DHS established TRIP in 2007 to provide a "one-stop
traveler redress process for coordinating the review, adjudica-
tion, and response to traveler redress requests."5 6 Before TRIP,
redress-seekers sent requests to each agency individually.57
Often this resulted in the redress-seeker having to spend much
time and energy figuring out which agency was able to resolve
the issue." Conversely, TRIP provides a centralized portal for
receiving inquiries and directing them to the appropriate agen-
48 TSA, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR TIVP, supra note 32, at 2.
49 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-476, supra note 2, at 41-44.
The TSA implemented 'Secure Flight to comply with a mandate in the Intelli-
gence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638, to assume watch list passenger comparison responsibilities from the
airlines. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE SECURE FLIGHT
PROGRAM 3 (2008) [hereinafter TSA, PRIVACY IMPACT AsSESSMENT FOR SFP].
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 49.
53 TSA, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR SFP, supra note 49, at 3.
54 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 7-8.
55 Id. at 8.
56 Id. at 3. The Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security support
this program with funds and personnel. Id.
57 Id. at 16-17.
58 Id. at 16.
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cies to evaluate and make a determination about that individ-
ual's watch-list status." It does this by replacing the five
independent redress systems that five separate agencies oper-
ated with one system.o
According to the DHS's TRIP website, individuals who have
experienced delays during or been denied airline boarding,
port entry, or border crossing, or individuals who have been re-
peatedly subjected to enhanced screening, should file a redress
inquiry."1 The inquiry form requests information about the indi-
vidual's travel experience and biographical information, includ-
ing a copy of a passport or other government issued
identification.6 2 Once an individual files a redress inquiry, TRIP
forwards it to the appropriate agency for review and assigns a
control number." The control number may assist with future
airline travel and allows the individual to check the redress-re-
quest status online.
After the respective agency investigates the inquiry and takes
appropriate action, if any, TRIP sends a letter to the individual
that is "designed to prevent recipients from learning whether
they are the subject of an active law enforcement investigation
or a terrorist watch-list record."" The letters provide no details
about the reason for the traveling troubles or about what ac-
tions, if any, the agency took to resolve the redress-seeker's
66issues.
III. THE NEED FOR CHANGE
As of 2009, the TSDB had 1,183,447 entries on it, comprising
about 400,000 unique individuals. 7 The terrorist watch lists, and
59 Id. at 11-13.
60 The following agencies or programs operated independent redress pro-
grams prior to TRIP: TSA, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, DHS's Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DHS's U.S. Visitor Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology program, and Department of Justice's Terrorists Screening Center.
Id. at 3.
61 DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), supra note 16.
62 Id.
63 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 9-13.
64 DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP), supra note 16. DHS also
claims this redress number will assist in preventing future misidentifications. Id.
65 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 90.
66 Id. at 89.
67 OIG, FBI WATCHLIST PRACTICES, supra note 36, at 1 & n.40. Individuals may
have multiple identifications on the list, such as aliases. Id. On average, each indi-
vidual has two entries on the list. Id.
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the No Fly List in particular, are expanding rapidly.68 At the
time of 9/11, the FAA's No Fly List had only twelve names it.69
However, in recent years that number has increased exponen-
tially.7 o For instance, the No Fly List doubled after the Decem-
ber 2009 "underwear bomber" attack.7' According to recent
estimates, the No Fly List contains 21,000 names, including
about 500 Americans.7 2 The exponential growth is concerning
given the deficiencies and drawbacks of the watch lists, such as
inadequate quality control procedures that diminish the lists' ef-
ficacy; the imposition of institutional costs, societal restructuring
costs, and immense personal costs on the listed individuals; and
the lack of an effective redress mechanisms for those
individuals.
A. QUALITY CONTROL ISSUES PLAGUE EFFICACY
The efficacy of the TSDB depends on the quality of the infor-
mation contained within it-that is, good information gets bet-
ter results. In a field where bad results can have disastrous
consequences, the government should continually strive for im-
provements in efficacy. But quality control issues plague the
watch lists.73
For example, the Department of Justice's Inspector General
found that FBI agents often do not follow watch-listing guide-
lines.7 ' The FBI is one entity responsible for nominating, modi-
fying, and requesting the removal of individuals from the
TSDB." In a report reviewing the FBI's watch-listing proce-
dures, the Inspector General found that an FBI agent's priori-
ties, rather than merit, dictated whether the agent timely
68 U.S. GoVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-476, supra note 2, at 14; see also
OIG, FBI WATCHLIST PRACTICES, supra note 36, at 1 & n.40 (explaining that there
are approximately 400,000 distinct individuals on the consolidated watch list and
that the FBI has nominated more than 68,000 identities to the list since its
inception).
69 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 22, at 82 (2004).
70 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. No. 07-41, FOLLOW-
uP AUDIT OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER, at iii (2007) [hereinafter OIG,
TSC AUDIT].
71 Factsheet: The ACLU's Challenge to the U.S. Government's "No Fly List", AM. Civ.
LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 6, 2014, 7:22 PM), https://www.aclu.org/national-securi
ty/factsheet-aclus-challenge-us-governments-no-fly-list.
72 Id.
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removed an individual from the watch list.7 6 And it found that
nearly 72% of all removals from 2006 to 2008 were untimely.77
In fact, the removal of one individual took 589 days.78 Having
outdated or incorrect information in lists diminishes the ability
of counterterrorism officials to recognize terrorists' plots and
capture potential perpetrators before an attack. Because the
TSDB entries populate the No Fly and Selectee Lists,79 the
problems with the TSDB carry over to those lists as well.
Some proponents of the watch lists, however, argue that a
dragnet approach is proper.80 Under such an approach, the
more people you have on the list the more likely you are to
catch an actual terrorist.8 ' A high rate of false positives (i.e., in-
dividuals designated to a watch list who in fact do not have ter-
roristic intentions) is the cost you pay for a low rate of false
negatives (i.e., individuals not designated to a watch list who in
fact do have terroristic intentions), and this trade off is worth it
given the cost of a false negative may be a 9/11-type event.8 2 But
this argument depends on the adequacy of the criteria used for
selecting risky individuals; that is, a dragnet approach only
works if it is sweeping up the right types of individuals.
The legitimacy of the government's criteria for selecting nom-
inees to a watch list is unclear.84 A Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report found that "no entity is routinely assessing
government-wide issues, such as how the changes have impacted
agency resources and the traveling public, whether watch-list
76 See id. at 36-45. The inconsistent adherence to procedures is not isolated to
the removal process but also extends to the nomination and modification of
identities. Id. at x-xv.
77 Id. at 38.
78 Id. at 40.
79 OIG, ROLE OF WATCH LisTs, supra note 43, at 9. While the No Fly and Selec-
tee List "have their own minimum substantive derogatory criteria requirements,"
they are still derivative lists that depend on the quality of the information in the
TSDB. Id.
80 SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE EROSION
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRAcy 67-69 (2011).
81 Id.
82 Bernstein, supra note 20, at 474.
83 See id.
84 See HERMAN, supra note 80, at 68. A former director of the TSC testified to
Congress that government agencies often base nominations on fragments of in-
formation and hearsay. Id. Little oversight or accountability is built into the sys-
tem. Id. Instead, the system is left to strike its own balance between civil liberties
and the need to prevent terrorism. Id. Unsurprisingly, this has led to significant
watch-list accuracy issues. Id. For example, Nelson Mandela was finally removed
from the terrorist watch list in July 2008 after Congress intervened. Id. at 69.
2014] 607
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screening is achieving intended results, or if adjustments to
agency programs or watch-listing guidance are needed.""5 This
tends to call into question the legitimacy of whatever criteria the
government uses to identify potential terrorists. The ability to
regularly quantify results is a necessary condition to effectively
managing any system, including a system like the TSDB. Other
similar reports have also found that widespread inaccuracy and
incompleteness persists in terrorist watch lists." The inaccuracy
further calls into question the legitimacy of the watch-list crite-
ria, and the incompleteness tends to indicate ineffective watch-
listing procedures. Ultimately, these shortcomings diminish the
efficacy of the watch lists.
B. THE COSTS
This inaccuracy is not without costs, both for the individuals
on the lists and the government agencies and people in society
that utilize the lists. The breakneck pace at which these lists are
expanding magnifies the costs." The inaccuracies in the lists (1)
impact the effectiveness of the lists themselves and of the intelli-
gence officers that utilize the lists to evaluate terrorist suspects;
(2) distort society's views of certain individuals; (3) impose high
personal, monetary, and time costs on the listed individuals or
classes of individuals; and (4) infringe on the listed individual's
privacy and personal liberties.
1. Impact on Government and Society
One commentator has suggested that government watch lists
have at least three broad effects on the government, its agents,
85 U.S. Gov'T AccoUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-476, supra note 2, at 16. As of
2012, no entity was even collecting the data needed to conduct such assessments.
Id. at 28. However, the TSC Director indicated that "conducting such assessments
and developing related metrics will be important in the future." Id. But this is
apparently not a focus of the TSC or other agencies involved with terrorist watch
lists. Id. Instead, the agencies focus on developing new screening and vetting pro-
grams. Id. It is hard to believe that such agencies will be able to develop effective
programs in the future without adequate assessments of the current programs.
86 See, e.g., OIG, FBI WATCHLIST PRACTICES, supra note 36, at 14-18.
87 A 2007 FBI Inspector General report found that the list continues to expand
by an average of 20,000 entries per month. OIG, TSC AUDIT, supra note 70, at iii.
"Deficiencies in the accuracy of watch-list data increase the possibility that relia-
ble information will not be available to frontline screening agents, which could
prevent them from successfully identifying a known or suspected terrorist . . .
[and] increase[ ] the chances of innocent persons being stopped or detained
. ... ." Id.
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and society. The lists (1) create overconfidence and diminish
the skills of government agents and agencies; (2) obscure the
complex reality from counterterrorism officials because of sim-
plification; and (3) alter society's and government's view of indi-
viduals based on the categories the government has chosen."
First, government agents' overconfidence and skill deteriora-
tion occurs because removing the context surrounding the data
an agent uses to evaluate a potential watch-listee makes the task
look less like evaluating data and more like fact-finding." Objec-
tive criteria may seem to support the terrorist database predic-
tions, but in reality, they depend on an agent's assessment of the
data.o The inability of that agent to recognize this distinction
weakens that agent's decision-making skills over time, the results
of which are confirmed by the watch list the agent helps to cre-
ate." The dispersed nature of the watch-listing community also
contributes to this problem by impeding the ability of an agent
to assess the correctness of a database's predictions since the
criteria of the predictive model are often unknown to the
agents.9 2
Second, the creators of lists tend to focus on a select few char-
acteristics and ignore others." While such simplification makes
categorizing individuals practical, "it also inevitably ignores
other attributes that may become important in their own
right."9 4 This in turn leads people to misinterpret the complex
reality and potentially misdirect institutional resources.95
Last, the commentator argues that "when governments and
other powerful institutions create new social categories, 'people
come to fit [those] categories' by reconceiving themselves in the
categories' terms."9 6 Government watch lists are such categories,
and consequently, they may cause government and society to
view members of society in accordance with that
9,7
categorization.
88 Bernstein, supra note 20, at 485-99.
89 Id. at 489-90.
90 See supra note 38; Bernstein, supra note 20, at 489-90.
91 Bernstein, supra note 20, at 490.
92 Id. at 489.
93 Id. at 491.
94 Id. at 491-92.
9 Id. at 492-93.
96 Id. at 494.
97 Id. at 499.
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2. Impact on Individuals
Individuals on watch lists also bear substantial costs them-
selves. The expansive growth of watch lists is likely to continue
diminishing personal liberties." Rahinah Ibrahim's story intro-
duced in Part I epitomizes the liberty costs individuals bear for
being on the No Fly List. In her case, the impact is life altering.
While she was able to finish her doctoral degree without re-
turning to the United States, her inclusion on the No Fly List
has curtailed her academic and professional pursuits.99 She has
not been able to collaborate face-to-face with her colleagues in
the United States, and she was unable to represent her country,
Malaysia, in an international conference held in San
Francisco.10
Rahinah Ibrahim's experience is not unique. Others who
have been placed on watch lists have seen their personal and
professional lives impacted as a result. For instance, U.S. Marine
Corps veteran Amayan Latif's inclusion on the No Fly List led to
the reduction of his disability benefits because it prevented him
from flying to the required evaluations and impeded his ability
to pursue studies in Egypt."o' In the end, the inclusion of one's
name on the No Fly or Selectee Lists has deleterious effects on
that individual's privacy and personal autonomy.1 0 2 It subjects
that individual to additional screening at airports, to restrictions
on travel, and generally, to greater scrutiny by the federal
government.10
Lastly, the financial and time costs of vindicating oneself may
be daunting while the result is often unclear. The average re-
dress period is fifty-seven days, 0 ' which does not guarantee a
98 The 9/11 Commission recognized the potential for the expanded govern-
ment powers to diminish personal liberties. 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 22,
at 393-95. It was in this realization that the commission made three recommen-
dations regarding personal liberty. Id. First, the President should determine what
may be shared among agencies and under what conditions, with privacy being a
key factor in the decision-making process. Id. at 394. Second, the President
should have the burden of proof for retaining the powers granted in the Patriot
Act, which were to sunset in 2005. Id. at 394-95. Last, the criteria of an oversight
board to monitor the impact on civil liberties and adherence to guidelines to
protect them. Id. at 395.
- Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2012).
100 Id.
101 Latif v. Holder, 3:10-CV-00750-BR, 2013 WL 4592515, at *3 (D. Or. 2013).
102 See id. at *3-6.
103 See id.
104 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 67.
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favorable result but instead just a vague answer. 05 In Rahinah
Ibrahim's case, she incurred the costs of two appeals before get-
ting to a trial on the merits."0 ' While not all individuals on a
Watch List will have to expend the same level of effort, they may
still incur substantial costs, such as hiring counsel at their own
expense, taking time away from work, or being forced to stop
working until the matter is cleared up due to a revoked security
clearance.o'0 For Rahinah Ibrahim, the saga has been dragged
out over nine years so far.108
The government imposes these burdens without an adequate
redress method.10 Instead, it tends to focus more on getting in-
dividuals on the list than getting innocent individuals off the
list."i0 Aliens bear the brunt of the burden."' Unlike an Ameri-
can resident or citizen, aliens may be able to avoid flying to or
from the United States, and thus avoid the impact of the list, but
that limitation on traveling may hamper their professional and
personal lives.'" 2 As a civilized society, we owe such individuals
the opportunity to remove the cloud on their name. The gov-
ernment continues to refine its redress procedures. The most
recent iteration is TRIP, which still leaves much to be desired.' 3
105 Id. at 90 (noting that the letters sent by the TSC to redress-seekers do not
disclose whether the individual was on the list or whether the individual is still on
the list).
10 Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 991-92 (9th Cir. 2012);
The Associated Press, supra note 14.
107 49 C.F.R. § 1560.203 (2013) (the redress procedures permit an individual
to be represented by counsel); HERMAN, supra note 80, at 69-70 (highlighting the
story of a helicopter pilot that was suspended with pay and nearly fired for his
inclusion on the No Fly List).
108 Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 987 (Ibrahim was denied boarding due to being on the
No Fly List on January 2, 2005); Dan Levine, UPDATE 2-U.S. Judge Rules Against
Government in No-Fly Challenge, REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/01/14/usa-noflylist-ruling-idUSL2NOKO24120140114 (noting that
a federal judge recently ruled in favor of Rahinah Ibrahim by ordering the gov-
ernment to disclose her No Fly List status and correct any mistaken information).
10 Factsheet: The ACLU's Challenge to the U.S. Government's "No Fly List", supra
note 71.
110 HERMAN, supra note 80, at 69.
111 See Factsheet: The ACLU's Challenge to the U.S. Government's "No Fly List", supra
note 71.
112 See Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 988.
"13 OIG, EFFEcTvIENEss OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 3.
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C. PROBLEMS WITH TRIP
The TRIP program is undoubtedly an improvement over the
previous redress programs."' The government invested signifi-
cant resources into developing a program that offers the ability
to handle redress issues across many disparate agencies."' This
program, however, comes up short in several areas. Numerous
government reports have highlighted the efficacy issues inher-
ent in the current redress process.11 6 Moreover, the government
generally hides the redress process from the public."' Com-
bined, the efficacy and transparency issues diminish the legiti-
macy of the TRIP program.
1. Efficacy
The usefulness of any government redress process rests in
part on the ability to rely on it to reach the proper conclusion.
However, the lack of adequate procedures casts doubt on the
appropriateness of such reliance.
The TRIP program consists of ten federal agencies and offices
that participate in the redress process."" These agencies have
made commitments to staff or fund the TRIP program, 19 but
no clear authority structure exists and standard operating proce-
dures are incomplete.12 0 Such structure is necessary in order to
promote effective participation by the many agencies.' 2 ' The
114 See supra Part II.C.
115 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 66.
116 See, e.g., id. at 19; OIG, FBI WATCHLIST PRACTICES, supra note 36 (The report
notes the issues with the nomination, modification, and removal of watch listed
individuals. It also notes the failure to remove watch listed individuals in a timely
manner, and the failure of agents to request removal of individuals even after
they determine that an individual should no longer be on the watch list.); U.S.
GoV'T ACCoUNTABILIT-Y OFFICE, GAO-12-476, supra note 2, at 2 (noting agencies
do not routinely assess the impacts of watch listing policies).
117 See DHS TRIP Application Process FAQ, DEPARTMENT HOMELAND SECURITY,
http://trip.dhs.gov/FAQ.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2014 at 2:49 PM).
118 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 29.
119 Terrorist Screening Ctr., Watchlist Redress Memorandum of Understanding, FBI
(Oct. 24, 2007), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/tsc-watchlist-redress-m.o.u
(explaining that the ten agencies listed have agreed to certain information shar-
ing, to correcting erroneous information when it is found, and to provide appro-
priate staff and resources to the redress process).
120 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 29.
121 Because "TRIP is a multiagency program with participants in a number of
locations, the repeatability of program operations depends on well-documented
procedures, clear guidance, and effective monitoring. Despite these operational
requirements, TRIP has been slow to develop detailed guidance, sound proce-
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lack of structure often leads to "unreliable and fluctuating sup-
port from [the] participating agencies" and offices. 1 2 2 The vary-
ing support consequently creates backlogs, delays, and
inconsistent handling of cases, which in turn negatively affect
the individuals seeking redress and diminishes the quality of the
lists.123
Additionally, independent or impartial adjudicators do not
take part in the TRIP redress decision-making process.124
Rather, the TRIP program triages and forwards redress requests
to the nominating agency to review and make a determina-
tion. Conversely, an independent and impartial adjudicator
could increase the process's fairness and add perspective to the
agencies' conclusions.1 2 6 These procedural deficiencies ulti-
mately diminish the efficacy with which TRIP operates.
2. Transparency
The TRIP process is cloaked in a veil of secrecy.' 2 7 The cur-
rent system provides redress-seekers with confirmation of re-
ceipt of their redress request and with confirmation when it is
closed. 12  But the government designs the correspondence to
obfuscate whether the redress-seeker was on the watch list or is
the target of an investigation.12 9 In fact, TRIP provides no infor-
mation regarding the current or former watch-list status to the
redress-seekers, nor does it provide an overview of the redress
activities the government performed.'
dures, or effective quality assurance measures to support consistent case han-
dling." Id. at 81.
122 Id. at 31. For instance, "the program operated for several months without"
one of the participating agency represented by a detailed agent. Id. The TRIP
program manager is often seen as a peer to the participating agencies. Id. As
such, the "agencies do not always respond promptly to the TRIP program man-
ager's requests for action, [and] on occasion," reject the requests. Id.
123 Id. at 80, 88, 107.
124 Id. at 34.
125 U.S. Gov'T AccoUNTABILIrY OFFICE, GAO-12-476, supra note 2.
126 See OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 89.
127 Id.
128 DHS TRIP Application Process FAQ supra note 117. When an individual sub-
mits a redreds application, the individual receives a "redress control number." Id.
The redress control number allows the individual to track the status online. Id.
The status will be one of four notations: in progress, closed, pending paperwork,
or no paperwork. Id.
129 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 89.
130 Id.
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Certain agencies within the government strenuously argue
that the secrecy is necessary to protect national security.' 3 How-
ever, at least in the No Fly and Selectee List context, such se-
crecy is arguably pointless.'3 2 An observant traveler can likely
deduce whether they are on either the No Fly or Selectee List
based on the treatment they receive from the airline and TSA
screening personnel.'3 3 For example, an individual on the Selec-
tee List will not be able "to print a boarding pass online or at an
airport kiosk" and will receive enhanced security screening
when passing through security checkpoints.1 3 4 Yet, the DHS still
operates the TRIP redress process with a high level of secrecy,
even for airline-travel-related complaints.1 3 5 This secrecy leaves
the redress-seekers unsure about the resolution of their travel-
ing troubles.x13
3. Legitimacy
The legitimacy of the process suffers from the efficacy defi-
ciencies and lack of transparency. The process not only lacks
legitimacy to the individuals seeking redress but also to the
American public. In order for the individual seeking redress to
find the process legitimate, he or she needs to understand the
process and believe that the process will produce ajust result.1 37
However, TRIP's obscure and inconsistent procedures make this
all but impossible.' Moreover, the efficacy shortcomings are
apparent to the public through news stories of Nelson
Mandela's inclusion on the No Fly List until Congress inter-
vened in 2008 and of the late-Senator Kennedy's inclusion on
the list.139
D. CHANGE NEEDED
The discussion above leads to the indelible conclusion that we
need a change. However, we must never forget that "Al Qaeda is
131 Letter from Arthur M. Cummins, II to Carlton I. Mann, supra note 41, at
125.
132 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 91-92.
133 Id.
'34 Id. at 92.
13 DHS TRIP Application Process FAQ supra note 117.
136 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 89-90.
137 "Clear and transparent communication can help petitioners understand
how their case has been handled, and provide assurance that it has been ad-
dressed appropriately." Id. at 89.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 120-35.
13- See HERIMAN, supra note 80, at 68-70.
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dependent upon travel, and each time an operative boards a
plane or crosses an international border, we have an opportu-
nity to detect and capture him."o4 0 Watch lists offer an impor-
tant vehicle for detecting and preventing future terrorist acts.'
But proper management and proper redress procedures are
critical. While one method may be depending on the law of
large numbers to ensure we capture all potential terrorists, a
more tailored method with a focus on efficacy and fairness
seems more in line with our societal values. The current process
is a role reversal for our legal system. Instead of people being
innocent until proven guilty, their freedom is restricted until
they are proven innocent.14 2 The choice should not be between
liberty and security."4
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Developing a solution to the issues inherent in the use of No
Fly and Selectee Lists is no easy task. On the one hand, the fair-
ness and privacy concerns weigh heavy. The method for adding
an individual to either the No Fly or Selectee List lacks fair-
ness.14 4 The government places individuals on the watch lists
based on fragments of information and hearsay with little to no
opportunity for that individual to confront the evidence against
them.'4 5 Moreover, the lists significantly limit an individual's
personal autonomy by restricting travel and intrude on an indi-
vidual's privacy."4 6 But on the other hand, the risks posed from
missing a chance to thwart a would-be terrorist attack are colos-
sal. In the context of the No Fly and Selectee Lists, overregulat-
ing the system could contribute to another 9/11-type event.' 7
140 Stewart A. Baker & Nathan Alexander Sales, Homeland Security, Information
Policy, and the Transatlantic Alliance, in LEGAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
TERROR 277, 280 (John Norton Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 2010).
141 More effective use of watch lists could have identified as many as three of
the 9/11 hijackers. See 9/11 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 22, at 384. However, no
one in the U.S. government was analyzing terrorists' travel patterns. Id.
142 HERMAN, supra note 80, at 69.
143 "The choice between security and liberty is a false choice, as nothing is
more likely to endanger America's liberties than the success of a terrorist attack
at home. Our history has shown us that insecurity threatens liberty. Yet, if our
liberties are curtailed, we lose the values that we are struggling to defend." 9/11
COMM'N REPORT, supra note 22, at 395.
144 See supra Part III.A.
145 See HERMAN, supra note 80, at 68-69.
146 See id.
147 "The cost of false positives must be balanced against that of false negatives.
The failure to detect the 9/11 plot was an exceptionally costly false negative."
6152014]
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However, the current system seems to have reached an equilib-
rium too heavily favoring national security with little regard to
personal liberties.14 8 The courts and commentators that have ad-
dressed the issue of watch lists generally have suggested a variety
of models.1 49 This article groups these suggestions into three
categories: (1) extending due process protections; (2) increas-
ing front-end efficacy; and (3) extending the Privacy Act of
1974. This section will discuss the benefits and drawbacks of
each of those categories.
A. EXTENDING DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS
The extension of due process rights to aliens outside the bor-
ders of the United States that are listed on the No Fly or Selec-
tee Lists provides an attractive method for the courts to assert
their prerogative to review the government's watch-listing deci-
sion. In Rahinah Ibrahim's case, the Ninth Circuit did just
that. 150
In Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security, the Ninth Circuit
crafted a new rule for the extension of the Fifth Amendment's
due process protections to those aliens outside the territory of
the United States that have developed "significant voluntary
connections" with the United States.' 51 In that case, the Ninth
Circuit read two Supreme Court cases together, Boumediene v.
Bush and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, to find that it should
apply a functional approach to the application of constitutional
rights to aliens outside our borders.'12 In reading these two
cases together, the Ninth Circuit constructed a rule that extends
due process rights to nonresident aliens who have developed a
significant voluntary connection with the United States.15 3 Ap-
plying it to Rahinah Ibrahim's situation, the court found that
the following facts established her significant voluntary connec-
tions with the United States: (1) she studied in the United States
for four years on a student visa; (2) she voluntarily departed; (3)
Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 245, 252
(2008).
148 See HERMAN, supra note 80, at 68-69.
149 See sources cited supra note 15.
150 Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 997 (9th Cir. 2012).
151 Id. The court in fact extended both the First and Fifth Amendments for
certain aliens. Id. This article only addresses the viability of the Fifth Amendment
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she intended to return after a brief stay abroad; and (4) the
trip's purpose was to further her connections with the United
States in that Stanford sponsored the trip.
In Ibrahim's case, the extraterritorial extension of the Fifth
Amendment provides her with a method to challenge her inclu-
sion on the No Fly List when she would have otherwise had
none. She had pursued the then-available redress program but
had not been successful.15 5 Without the court stepping in, her
struggle to remove her name from the No Fly List would have
ended unsuccessfully.15 1 While this is an appealing avenue for
courts in that it provides the courts with an unassailable method
to review the government's No Fly and Selectee Lists decisions,
the legal footing upon which the logic stands is questionable,
and it is unclear what type of system the Due Process Clause
might require.
1. Shaky Legal Footing
The Ninth Circuit employed a novel approach to the extrater-
ritoriality of the Fifth Amendment in Ibrahim; however, this
novel approach required misreading both Boumediene and
Verdugo.'57 It also ignored Supreme Court precedent and history
regarding the role of courts in foreign affairs. The executive tra-
ditionally has been the "sole organ" of the nation on foreign
affairs.' 5 8 The scope of the foreign affairs power includes the
154 Id.
155 Id. at 987-88.
156 See id. at 991.
157 Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (addressing the is-
sue of whether the Suspension Clause applies to enemy combatants detained at
Guantanamo Bay. Rejecting the government's territorial approach, the Court an-
nounced a functional test that looked at three factors to determine the extraterri-
torial reach of the Suspension Clause) with United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. 259, 261, 272 (1990) (dealing with the extraterritorial scope of the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against illegal search and seizures. In holding
that the Fourth Amendment's protections did not apply, the Court stated that
aliens receive constitutional protections when they (1) enter the United States,
and (2) develop significant voluntary connections with the United States).
158 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
Some argue that Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952),
shifted control of the foreign affairs power to give the bulk of it to Congress. See
Robert F. Turner, U.S. Constitutional Issues in the Struggle Against Terrorism, in LE-
GAL ISSUES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERROR 81, 97-98 (John Norton Moore &
Robert F. Turner eds., 2010). However, there is a stronger argument that Curtiss-
Wright controls when the Court is addressing the executive's foreign affairs
power. Id. at 98-102.
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ability to make policies regarding aliens.' 9 Historically, constitu-
tional protections extended to aliens only while they were within
the United States in order to promote trade, to grow the popula-
tion, and to prevent international conflicts."'o Thus, the footing
upon which the Ibrahim court's decision stands seems unstable
in light of precedent and history.
Additionally, the Ibrahim court's rule only provides constitu-
tional protections to some subsets of aliens that have developed
"significant voluntary connections" with the United States.1 "' Al-
though the contours of this test are undefined, it clearly does
not cover all individuals that the No Fly and Selectee Lists im-
pact.' Instead, it leaves the potential to challenge one's inclu-
sion on such lists at the whims of a court.
2. Does the Current System Meet the Due Process Requirements?
Assuming the Ibrahim court is correct in extending due pro-
cess protections to aliens such as Rahinah Ibrahim, the question
then is whether the current system meets the Due Process
Clause's strictures. Three factors are relevant to this determina-
tion under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test: "(1) the pri-
vate interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's in-
terest, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail."'
The first step in the analysis is to identify the private interest
affected. The No Fly and Selectee Lists restrict ones ability to
enter an airport's sanitized area as well as the ability to board a
plane.'16 Such restrictions potentially infringe upon three pro-
tected interests: limiting the right to travel, restricting employ-
1s Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1950) ("It is pertinent to
observe that any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with con-
temporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war
power, and the maintenance of a republican form of government. Such matters
are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference.").
160 J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95
GEO. L.J. 463, 507-08 (2007).
161 Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 997.
162 See id.
163 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
-6 OIG, EFFEcTIvENEss OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 91-92.
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ment, or imposing a stigma." Inclusion on the No Fly List
precludes one's ability to travel on a commercial airline, which
essentially makes international and certain domestic travel im-
possible, or at least highly impractical."' 6 Similarly, being listed
on the No Fly List may preclude one from working on airlines
that fly to or within the United States."6 ' Likewise, one's inclu-
sion on the No Fly and Selectee List may impose an impermissi-
ble stigma under the Paul v. Davis stigma-plus framework.' 8 For
example, Rahinah Ibrahim's inability to fly to the United States
because of her inclusion on the No Fly List may meet the stigma-
plus requirements in that the listing has tarnished her name and
precluded her from attending professional conferences and
other meetings that have affected her career."' Individuals on
the Selectee List may also meet the stigma-plus requirements.
Inclusion on that list arguably imposes a stigma on that individ-
ual as well as additional burdens, such as the inability to check-
in online or at airport kiosks and the additional time required
during the process of checking in. 7 o
After identifying a protected interest, the next step in the
analysis is to determine whether the current system is sufficiently
tailored to meet the requirements of due process. This requires
applying the three-factor Mathews balancing test to the current
system. The No Fly and Selectee Lists should be evaluated sepa-
rately under this test since their level of deprivation is
different. 171
The No Fly List would likely fail this test. The private interests,
and the deprivation thereof, are significant, and the risk of erro-
neous deprivation is high with the current procedures.172 How-
ever, the government's interest is also substantial-that is,
165 Justin Florence, Making the No Fly List Fly: A Due 1Process Model for Terrorist
Watchlists, 115 YALE L.J. 2148, 2159-65 (2006).
166 See OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 7, 36. Restrictions on an
individual's ability to fly on a case-by-case basis may violate the right of travel.
Florence, supra note 165, at 2160-62.
167 See HERMAN, supra note 80, at 69-70. Certain air travel employees', like pi-
lots', loss of employment due to inclusion on a watch list may preclude the indi-
vidual from pursuing a chosen occupation and require due process. Florence,
supra note 165, at 2162-63.
168 Florence, supra note 165, at 2164-65 (Stigma-plus generally requires a gov-
ernment action that tarnishes a person's reputation accompanied by some other
government action).
169 Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2012).
170 Shane, supra note 15, at 853 n.117.
171 See supra Part II.B.
172 See supra Part II.B.
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stopping a terrorist attack. The cost of additional procedures
and the administrative burden is also likely quite high since
thousands of individuals are on the list.' 7 3 Providing all of these
individuals with additional procedural safeguards would create a
significant administrative burden on a system that is already
struggling to keep up. 7 4 Weighing these factors, the private in-
terest and risk of erroneous deprivation seem high enough to
require some type of additional procedures. 17
The Selectee List analysis, however, likely comes out in the
government's favor.' 76 Because the interests affected are less
weighty,' 7 7 the government's procedures for the Selectee List
are likely constitutionally sufficient."1 7  The Selectee List does
not preclude flying to or within the United States; instead, it
subjects listed individuals to enhanced screening during their
journey.17 9 It may also affect a limited number of foreign pilots
and airline workers who regularly travel to the United States
who are on that list.18 0 The risk of erroneous deprivation and
cost of additional procedures are likely the same as the No Fly
List.'"' However, when weighing these factors in context of the
Selectee List, the significant government interest outweighs the
private interest, risk of erroneous deprivation, and the need for
additional procedures.18 2
The due process model attempts to fix the systematic
problems with a blunt instrument rather than the needed scal-
pel. Functionally, this approach will lead to much uncertainty
for the traveling public and the government employees tasked
with administering this program. In an area so crucial to our
national security, injecting constitutional rights for a broader set
of aliens abroad seems inappropriate. Additionally, it will likely
require vindicating one's rights in court rather than through
less costly, less burdensome administrative procedures. While
'7 See Factsheet: The ACLU's Challenge to the U.S. Government's "No Fly List", supra
note 71.
174 See supra Part III.A.
175 See id.
176 But see Shane, supra note 15, at 843 n.117 (noting that some argue that
inclusion on the Selectee List may also unconstitutionally deprive an individual
of a protected right).
77 See supra Part II.B.
178 See id.
179 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 91-92.
18 See Florence, supra note 165, at 2162-63.
18' See supra text accompanying notes 173-74.
182 See Posner, supra note 147, at 252-53.
NO FLY AND SELECTEE LISTS
the due process requirements may be a useful conceptual start-
ing point,'13  the courts providing such rights is wholly
inappropriate.
B. INCREASING FRONT-END EFFICACY
Inaccuracy and incompleteness plague the watch lists.18 4 De-
signing a system to improve the front-end procedures could sig-
nificantly reduce the burden the watch lists place on innocent
individuals.185 The watch-list nomination process and the TRIP
system suffer from, among other things, incomplete standard
operating procedures, lack of an authority structure, and incon-
sistent support from participating agencies.'"' These issues lead
to inconsistent handling of cases and confusion among the
agencies about the proper procedures to follow when evaluating
nominations and redress requests."' The government bureau-
cracy does not timely address these issues because no agency is
routinely assessing government-wide problems or evaluating the
costs and the benefits of the current watch-list procedures.' 8 Ul-
timately, the front-end issues diminish the reliability and useful-
ness of the lists and unnecessarily impact individuals
erroneously placed on the watch lists.'
Modifying the front-end nomination process to address these
deficiencies may improve the quality of the lists. In order to in-
crease front-end efficacy, the government would have to (1) in-
stitute and disseminate written protocols to all participating
agencies; (2) refine the decision-making process so that it pro-
duces reliable and consistent results; (3) develop adequate qual-
ity control procedures, including methods for assessing accuracy
and addressing weaknesses; and (4) develop technology systems
to facilitate this structure."'o The current system is either par-
183 See Shane, supra note 15, at 841-45.
184 HERMAN, supra note 80, at 68-69.
185 See id.
186 See supra Part III.
187 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 29-32 (noting the lack of
clear operational authorities and responsibilities and the impact that this can
have on the watch lists).
188 See U.S. Gov'r ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-476, supra note 2, at 12.
189 See OIG, FBI WATCHLIST PRACTICES, supra note 36, at 36-45 (noting that the
incomplete policies and failure to adhere to existing policies result in watch list
errors due to failures to correctly nominate, modify, or remove individuals from
the watch lists).
190 Shane, supra note 15, at 836-37. The author advocates such a system that
he calls "Bureaucratic Justice." Id. at 810. His system would inject fairness into the
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tially or completely lacking in all of these areas.'91 Numerous
Inspector General and GAO reports have noted the need for the
agencies managing the watch lists to improve on some or all of
these areas.' 9 2 Such improvements are desirable and achieva-
ble.' 9 3 The changes would benefit the government in that they
would increase the accuracy of the watch lists and, consequently,
the chances of preventing a terrorist attack.' 94 Likewise, the
changes would benefit individuals by limiting the number of in-
dividuals erroneously included on the lists."'
However, it is unlikely that increasing front-end fairness by
itself will sufficiently guard against the fairness and efficacy is-
sues. A basic refrain echoes from national security hawks and
agencies supporting the watch lists: "The intelligence services
have no alternative to casting a wide net with a fine mesh if they
are to have reasonable prospects of obtaining the clues that will
enable future terrorists attacks on the United States to be pre-
vented."'96 Stated differently: If agencies are left to strike their
own balance between national security and civil liberties, the
agencies will strike the balance heavily in favor of national secur-
ity.1 '9 Moreover, the ability of such a front-end system to work
depends on human actors. 98 Even if agency employees follow
front-end procedures, human error is inevitable.'99 While
proper quality control systems may catch many of these mis-
takes, undoubtedly some will be missed. Thus, a properly tai-
lored redress system is essential.
front-end procedures. Id. at 821. This requires five characteristics: (1) clear writ-
ten standards; (2) robust nominating procedures; (3) regular auditing; (4) ade-
quate information technology systems to facilitate interagency sharing; and (5)
special procedures for the handling of uncorroborated tips and pattern match-
ing. Id. at 836-37. The author would then base the redress system on the extent
to which the agency implemented the front-end fairness procedures. Id. at
851-53.
191 U.S. Gov'T ACcoUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-476, supra note 2, at 12-13.
192 See, e.g., id.; OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 29-32.
193 See OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 29-32.
194 See id.
195 See id.
196 Posner, supra note 147, at 252-53.
197 See HERMAN, supra note 80, at 68.
19s Cf OIG, FBI WATCHLIST PRACTICES, supra note 36, at 29-30 (explaining that
FBI agents failed to follow procedures in place due to lack of experience, train-
ing, awareness, or appreciation of an agent's role in the process and that the
failure to follow the procedures impacted the watch list accuracy).
-9 See id.
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C. THE PRIVACY ACT oF 1974
Extending the Privacy Act of 1974 is yet another option for
addressing the efficacy and fairness concerns inherent in the
watch-listing process.20 0 Congress enacted the Privacy Act in re-
sponse to the growing amount of data in the government's pos-
session and the concerns about the power that the government
could wield by using such data.201 The Privacy Act regulates
agencies' collection, use, and disclosure of information on indi-
viduals." In particular, the Privacy Act imposes limits on the
information agencies may maintain on individuals to that which
is required for an agency's mission.20 s And it requires agencies
to maintain records "with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness,
and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to
the individual" in making determinations about that individ-
ual. 04 In order to enforce these provisions, the Privacy Act pro-
vides that individuals may see and request corrections to the
files agencies have on them.205 However, agencies in certain situ-
ations may exempt entire systems of records from the Act so
long as they publish a rule notifying the public of exemption.2 06
The exemptions generally pertain to law enforcement and na-
tional security activities and government personnel related
records.207
The intent of the Privacy Act was to provide citizens with a
strong enforcement power and place strict limits on agencies.20 s
It seeks to accomplish this goal by placing the vindication right
in the hands of the person most vested in the correctness of the
files: the individual.209
200 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
201 Brumbach, supra note 15, at 1029-31.
202 33 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE, JUDICIAL REVIEW § 8446 (1st ed. 1969 & Supp. 2013).
203 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (1).
204 Id. § 552a(e) (5).
205 Henke v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 1456-57 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
("The Privacy Act-unlike the Freedom of Information Act-does not have dis-
closure as its primary goal. Rather, the main purpose of the Privacy Act's disclo-
sure requirement is to allow individuals on whom information is being compiled
and retrieved the opportunity to review the information and request that the
agency correct any inaccuracies.").
206 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)-(k).
207 Id.
208 Brumbach, supra note 15, at 1048.
209 Id.
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However, there are some pitfalls. First, the exemptions in the
Privacy Act permit agencies to exempt most, if not all, of the
terrorists related databases, including the No Fly and Selectee
Lists.2 10 Opening the agencies to the Privacy Act's strictures may
expose sensitive information contained within the agencies that
is not yet being used to infringe upon the individual's personal
liberties.211 For instance, the agency may obtain information
during an investigation that does not lead them to nominate the
individual to a terrorist watch list.2 12 In the national security con-
text, it should only be upon an actual deprivation, such as the
listing on the No Fly List and consequent inability to board a
commercial airline, that the agency must validate its decision. 2 13
Second, the Privacy Act only applies to citizens and resident
aliens.2 14 Considering the vast majority of individuals on the No
Fly and Selectee Lists are nonresident aliens,1 5 expanding the
applicability of the Privacy Act to capture the air-security watch
lists will not benefit most of the affected individuals.2 1 6 Lastly,
the Privacy Act only permits fixing incorrect facts, not incorrect
conclusions.2 1 7 Many times the decision to list an individual on a
watch list depends on inferences drawn from the facts.2 1 8 While
correcting erroneous underlying facts may cause an agency to
change its conclusion, it does not necessarily require such an
action. Thus, seeking redress through the Privacy Act may leave
the redress-seeker in the same position.
V. ANOTHER FRAMEWORK
The previously discussed solutions either incorrectly or in-
completely address the problems individuals listed on either the
No Fly List or Selectee List face. Undoubtedly, improvements to
210 STEVE C. POSNER, PRIVACY LAW AND THE USA PATRIOT AcT § 9.28 (Supp.
2009). Agencies tasked with managing the terrorist watch lists generally do not
welcome individual corrections. Id.
211 "[I]t is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or
untimely information may acquire new significance as further investigation
brings new details to light." Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 16.96).
212 See id.
213 See id.
214 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a) (2) (2012).
215 Factsheet: The ACLU's Challenge to the U.S. Government's "No Fly List", supra
note 71.
216 See id.
217 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k) (5).
218 See HERMAN, supra note 80, at 68.
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the front-end watch-listing procedures are necessary. Such im-
provements should include establishing clear authority struc-
tures; instituting and disseminating best practices policies to all
employees involved in the watch-listing process; clearly defining
requirements for the listing of an individual on a watch list; im-
plementing routine and independent quality control proce-
dures; and developing and monitoring metrics to measure the
costs and benefits of the watch-listing procedures in place.2 2
However, front-end improvements are only a part of the solu-
tion. The Selectee and No Fly Lists place heavy burdens on the
traveling public listed on either of those lists. 2 2 1 Such burdens
should have correspondingly equal opportunities for redress.
Without an appropriate backend redress system, the institu-
tional bias in favor of watch-listing an individual will result in
undue burdens.2
In other contexts involving terrorism, the government uses
systems that provide a greater level of transparency and judicial
review but still protect against the dissemination of classified in-
formation. The process the Secretary of State uses to designate a
Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) is one such system.22s Im-
plementing a similar system in the aviation watch-list context will
curtail many of the deficiencies in that system.
A. THE STATUTORY STRUCTURE
The Secretary of State designates groups as FTOs that engage
or intend to engage in terrorist activities. 4 In order to desig-
nate an organization as a FTO, the Secretary must make three
statutorily required findings: (1) that the organization is for-
eign; (2) that the organization engages or intends to engage in
terrorism; and (3) that the activities threaten the national secur-
ity of the United States. 2 25 In making these findings, the Secre-
219 See generally OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 79-108; OIG,
FBI WATCHLIST PRACTICES, supra note 36, at iv-xxv.
220 See OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 1-2.
221 See supra Part II.B.
222 See HERMAN, supra note 80, at 68.
223 See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012).
224 Bureau of Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organization, U.S. DEPARTMENT
STATE (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
225 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (1).
The Secretary is authorized to designate an organization as a for-
eign terrorist organization in accordance with this subsection if the
Secretary finds that:
(A) the organization is a foreign organization;
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tary may rely on both classified and non-classified information
but must compile an administrative record in support of the des-
ignation." 6 The statute further requires that the Secretary notify
certain congressional leaders seven days prior to designating an
organization and then publish the designation in the Federal
Register seven days after notifying the congressional leaders.
The designation lasts until it is revoked or is set aside by the
courts.2
Nevertheless, FTOs may request the Secretary to review the
designation after two years.229 In the request, the FTO must pre-
sent relevant evidence that the circumstances supporting the
designation "are sufficiently different from the circumstances
that were the basis for the designation such that a revocation
with respect to the organization is warranted."23 0 The Secretary
must then publish a decision within 180 days in the Federal
Register.231
Additionally, FTOs may seek judicial review in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia within thirty days of pub-
lication in the Federal Register of a designation, amendment, or
other determination.2 3 2 The court reviews the designation solely
based on the administrative record, but the Secretary may pro-
vide the court with classified information to review ex parte and
in camera. 2 3 3 In assessing the Secretary's decision, the court ap-
plies standards similar to those found in the Administrative Pro-
cedures Act-that is, the court asks whether the decision was
arbitrary and capricious, contrary to constitutional right, in ex-
cess of statutory authority, lacking substantial support in the re-
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in
section 1182(a) (3) (B) of this title or terrorism (as defined
in section 2656f(d) (2) of title 22), or retains the capability
and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism); and
(C) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threat-
ens the security of United States nationals or the national
security of the United States.
Id.
226 Id. § 1189(a) (3).
227 Id. § 1189(a) (2) (A).
228 Id. § 1189(a) (4) (A).
229 Id. § 1189(a) (4). The prior version of the statute required the Secretary to
renew the designation every two years or else it would expire. Bureau of
Counterterrorism, supra note 224.
230 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (4) (B) (iii).
231 Id. § 1189(a) (4) (B) (iv) (III).
232 Id. § 1189(c)(1).
233 Id. § 1189(c) (2).
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cord, or otherwise not in accord with the law. 2 3 4 However, the
court has found the third finding, that is, that the organization's
activity threatens the national security of the United States, is
nonjusticiable."6
B. EQUITIES OF THE SYSTEM
Commentators have criticized the system for due process is-
sues and the lack of an impartial adjudicator in making the ini-
tial designation decision.2 " But when compared to the current
system for listing individuals on the No Fly and Selectee Lists, it
offers a practical alternative with significant improvements.
First, the FT0 statute requires the Secretary of State to make
certain findings before designating an organization as an
FTO.2 3 Unlike the No Fly and Selectee Lists, this criteria is pub-
lic. 238 Second, the requirement to compile an administrative re-
cord that is the sole support for the designation provides a basis
upon which the courts can review the agency's decision.2 39 Ap-
plication of this requirement to the aviation-security watch-list
context would also improve the effectiveness of any other inde-
pendent review, such as internal quality control mechanisms im-
plemented as part of improvements in front-end efficacy.2 4 0
Third, while the record is not a result of a "run-of-the-mill ad-
ministrative proceeding . . . ,"'241 and the Secretary is not re-
quired to divulge classified information to the FTO,2 4 2 the level
of disclosure and administrative process far exceeds the aviation-
234 People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir.
1999); compare 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (scope of review under the Administrative
Procedures Act) with 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c) (3) (scope of review under the Designa-
tion of Foreign Terrorist Organizations statute).
235 People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 182 F.3d at 23.
236 Micah Wyatt, Designating Terrorist Organizations: Due Process Overdue, 39
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 221, 224 (2009) (arguing that 8 U.S.C. § 1189 does not
meet procedural due process requirements).
237 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (1).
238 Compare OIG, ROLE OF WATCH LISTS, supra note 43, at 9-11 (indicating that
there is some criteria for including an individual on the No Fly and Selectee Lists
but redacting the criteria) with 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (1) (providing the three re-
quired findings the Secretary must make to designate an organization FTO).
239 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (3).
240 See id.
241 See People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dept. of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (In the FTO designation process, "there is no adversary hearing, no
presentation of what courts and agencies think of as evidence, no advance notice
to the entity affected by the Secretary's internal deliberations.").
242 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c) (2).
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security watch-listing and redress procedures.2 4 8 Moreover, the
fact that the Secretary publishes the designation of the FTO in
the Federal Register also increases transparency. 244 In contrast,
the government deliberately obfuscates whether an individual is
on the No Fly or Selectee Lists. 45
Lastly, there is a certain practicality to implementing a system
framed on the FTO designation system. First, a version of the
FTO system has been in place for over a decade,24 6 so the execu-
tive branch has institutional knowledge about the system. It has
apparently figured out how to balance its competing priorities
of protecting national security and compliance with the stat-
ute.24 7 Second, the courts have dealt with the system in a num-
ber of cases, leaving a body of precedent with which to apply to
future cases.248 However, some changes are necessary to appro-
priately tailor this system to the aviation watch-list setting.
C. TRANSLATING TO THE NO FLY AND SELECTEE CONTEXT
Applying the FTO statute to the No Fly and Selectee watch-
listing procedures will require at least four changes. First, the
timeframe for requesting the Secretary to reconsider an FTO
designation is overly onerous. Designated organizations must
243 See OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 89. It is important to
remember that in today's administrative state much of the way Congress controls
the agencies is through process. David S. Rubenstein, "Relative Checks": Towards
Optimal Control of Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2169, 2206-07
(2010). The idea is that by requiring agencies to perform certain tasks prior to
acting, the agency (or really its officials) will make more informed, and ultimately
better, decisions. Id. It is at least arguable that additional procedures may im-
prove the overall result of the watch-listing system by structuring those decisions
to take into account pertinent information. See id.
244 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2) (A).
245 OIG, EFFECTIVENESS OF TRIP, supra note 17, at 89.
246 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, Title III, § 302(a), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1189
(2012)). This law added the FTO section to the existing statute on April 24, 1996.
Id.
247 See id.
248 See, e.g., People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 613 F.3d 220,
226-28 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the Secretary of State violated the People's
Mojahiden Organization of Iran's due process rights and discussing how the Sec-
retary may satisfy them); Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251
F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[O]ur only function in reviewing a designation
of an organization as a foreign terrorist organization 'is to decide if the Secretary,
on the face of things, had enough information before her to come to the conclu-
sion that the organizations were foreign and engaged in terrorism.'").
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wait two years before requesting the initial reconsideration.2 4 9 In
the aviation-security context, this restriction would place a great
burden on the individual that has to wait for reconsideration,
and it does not further the goal of improving the watch lists by
removing improperly listed individuals.2 5 0 However, restricting
subsequent reconsideration requests for a certain time period
makes sense in order to cut down on administrative burden of
repeated requests.
Second, the notice requirements are problematic in some
contexts. For one, the current FTO statute requires one to seek
judicial review of a designation within thirty days from the date
of publication in the Federal Register. 251 For the vast majority of
the individuals listed on the No Fly and Selectee Lists, this would
likely negate any opportunity forjudicial review. 2 5 2 Most individ-
uals do not regularly monitor the Federal Register, and the
listed individuals may have no reason to suspect their listing on
a watch list during that timeframe if they do not attempt to
board an airplane during that time. Either removing this limita-
tion or extending it for a period longer than one year should
suffice to overcome this issue. 2 5 8 Additionally, building some
flexibility into the notification requirements would address po-
tential issues with immediate notification. There may be situa-
tions in which national security considerations outweigh the
benefit of notifying the individual. For instance, the FBI argues
that notifying the individuals listed on a watch list could jeop-
ardize an ongoing investigation.2 5 4 Other exigent circumstances
may arise in which immediate notification may frustrate national
security efforts .2 5 5 A short delay in notifying the individual, such
as 90 to 120 days, seems appropriate to handle such concerns.
Third, the government must adjust the criteria to fit the avia-
tion security context. The current criteria generally seem appro-
priate,2 56 but they need tailoring. Such tailoring will reduce the
likelihood of including an individual that poses no threat to avi-
ation security on the No Fly and Selectee Lists.2 5 ' Fourth, for
249 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (4) (B) (ii).
250 See id.
251 Id. § 1189(c) (1).
252 See id.
253 See id.
254 Letter from Arthur M. Cummins, II to Carlton I. Mann, supra note 41.
255 See id.
256 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (1).
257 See id.
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those individuals entitled to due process protections, the TSA
will likely need to modify the procedures to "provide notice of
those unclassified items upon which [it] proposes to rely to the
entity to be designated ... [and] the opportunity to be heard at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. ... "2581 How-
ever, the hearing need not be the equivalent of a judicial trial;
instead, the opportunity to refute the unclassified material in
writing will suffice. 5 9
Obviously, this is not a flawless system. However, making the
suggested changes to the No Fly and Selectee Lists systems
would be a meaningful and practical improvement. First, the in-
stituting of clear criteria for listing an individual based on a re-
viewable administrative record will improve the efficacy issues
with the current list. Such additional procedures will also im-
prove the agencies' decision-making by subjecting it to indepen-
dent review. Second, providing notification of the facts
supporting a watch list nomination to the watch-listed individual
with the opportunity for that individual to confront those facts
both within the agency and through judicial review increases the
fairness of the watch lists significantly. Third, the publishing of
the watch-list criteria, the notification of individuals on the lists,
and the publicity of the redress process will add much needed
transparency. Lastly, while the new process will require the gov-
ernment to divulge some information it currently keeps se-
cret,200 it will still protect classified information. 2 6 1
VI. CONCLUSION
The current aviation-security watch-list structure needs to
change. The lists impose a high burden on those individuals en-
tangled in their web.26 2 They deservingly entrap some individu-
als, but the dragnet approach currently employed also ensnares
many innocent individuals, subjecting them to the same conse-
quences. 26 ' This approach may work to minimize the occur-
258 Nat'1 Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C.
Cir. 2001). This court addresses, among other things, what requirements the Sec-
retary of State must meet to satisfy the due process rights of those FTO designees
entitled to such protections. Id. at 200-03.
259 Id.
260 See OIG, ROLE OF WATCH LisTs, supra note 43, at 46-53 (redacting all of the
criteria for selecting individuals for the No Fly and Selectee Lists).
261 See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c) (2).
262 See supra Part II.B.
263 See, e g., Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 986, 1004-05 (9th
Cir. 2012).
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rence of false negatives. However, the cost of the false positives
dictates a more tailored approach in line with our societal values
of privacy and personal autonomy. Even though the vast major-
ity of individuals listed on the No Fly and Selectee Lists are non-
resident aliens, 264 we as a civilized society owe these individuals
an opportunity to remove the cloud from their name. The watch
lists still impose a significant burden on those individuals. 26 5 The
story of Rahinah Ibrahim introduced in Part I illustrates the bur-
dens these individuals endure and the lack of effective redress
procedures available. Moreover, limiting the number of inno-
cent individuals on the watch lists will improve the efficacy of
these lists. 2 6 6 Undoubtedly, erroneously including individuals on
these lists distracts the government's attention from those indi-
viduals who intend to do us harm.
The courts and a number of commentators have suggested
various frameworks for addressing the watch-list problem gener-
ally. Their suggestions include extending due process and other
constitutional protections to certain nonresident aliens; increas-
ing front-end efficacy; and extending the Privacy Act of 1974.267
Each of these suggestions is incomplete or inadequate for vari-
ous reasons. 268 This article suggests a system framed on the stat-
ute currently in place for designating FTOs.2 6 9 While this system
is subject to criticism on due process and other grounds,270 it
offers a practical alternative that would improve both the effi-
cacy and fairness of the No Fly and Selectee watch-listing
procedures.
However, any proposal, such as the one made in this article,
about how to structure the No Fly and Selectee watch-listing pro-
cedures is necessarily incomplete. We are looking from the
outside in. The government classifies much of the current
watch-listing procedures and statistics. 2 71 The costs and the ben-
efits are uncertain.2 7 2 While 9/11 is an easy cost at which to
point, the next attack almost certainly will not be in the same
vein. An equally vexing problem is the benefits of the current
264 See Factsheet: The ACLU's Challenge to the US. Government's "No Fly List", supra
note 71.
265 See, e.g., Ibrahim, 669 F.3d at 986.
266 See supra Part III.A.
267 See supra Part IV.
268 See id.
269 See supra Part V.
270 See id.
271 See Letter from Arthur M. Cummins, II to Carlton I. Mann, supra note 41.
272 HERMAN, supra note 80, at 84-85.
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procedures and of additional, likely more cumbersome, proce-
dures. This incapacity is, in essence, the problem with govern-
ment secrecy-it prevents the electorate from reaching a
reasoned decision on an issue. 7
The United States is currently in the midst of a discussion
about the role of the National Security Agency in our society.2 7 4
While this is certainly a valid discussion to have, we should
broaden the focus to address the larger issue of balancing our
national security interests with our privacy and personal auton-
omy interests. Such a discussion would surely address, among
other things, the use of the No Fly and Selectee Lists as well as
the terrorist watch lists as a whole.
273 Id. at 43.
274 See Ellen Nakashima & Greg Miller, Obama Calls for Significant Changes in
Collection of Phone Records of U.S. Citizens, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/politics/in-speech-obama-to-call-for-restructuring-of-nsas-
surveillance-program/2014/01/17/e9d5a8ba-7f6e-1 1e3-95c6-0a7aa80874bcsto
ry.html.
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